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1. What are states o f affairs?
Instead of offering a definition, it seems best to indicate where to look for
states of affairs. We are likely to find them when we are sorting through
the intentional objects of our intentional experiences, above all the inten­
tional objects of perceptions. Consider: I am looking at a glass on a table. I
perceive the glass, I perceive the table. But I also perceive (1) that the
glass is on the table; (1) is a state of affairs. And I also perceive (2) that the
glass is translucent; (2) is another state of affairs. Moreover, I perceive (3)
that nothing else is on the table; (3) is also a state of affairs. Moreover, I
immediately perceive (4) that the glass is not a glass designed by N. N.,
but (5) that it is either a glass designed by N'. N'. or by N". N ";  (4) and
(5), too, are states of affairs.
Perception, however, is not the only place where states of affairs may be
found. Person X hopes (wishes, believes, knows, rejects, accepts, denies,
asserts, imagines, fears, thinks it likely, thinks it unlikely, etc.) (6) that A.
Normally, a singular term of the form “that A” will name a state of affairs.
At least, this is a legitimate prima facie assumption. And it need not be ac­
cepted without argument: Suppose someone asked, “ Which state of affairs
among those we have been considering is the most important one?” In
most cases, the answer would have the form “The state of affairs that A”,
or simply “That A”. This shows that expressions of the form “that A” are,
or function just like, singular terms. One might claim that expressions of
the form “[the state of affairs] that A”, though singular terms, never refer
to what they are supposed to refer to. But this claim, in turn, needs (a lot
of) argument.
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2. How are states o f affairs related to propositions?
The referential device “that A” which forms singular terms from sentences
can be used to name both propositions and states of affairs. Indeed, in each
instance of its use it can be taken to name both a state of affairs and a
proposition if it can be taken to name anything at all -  though frequently
the two referential functions will not be on equal footing. It is true that
some phrases of the form “X Rs that A” do not sound well if “the proposi­
tion” is inserted at the left of “that” -  for example, “Jack perceives the
proposition  that the glass is standing on the table”; and it is also true that
some phrases of the form “X Rs that A” do not sound well if “the state of
affairs” is inserted at the left o f “that” -- for example, “Jack asserts the state
o f  affairs that the universe is infinite.” But, in fact, some phrases of the
form “X Rs that A” do not sound well whether one inserts “the proposi­
tion” or “the state of affairs” at the left of “that” -  for example, “Jack
hopes the proposition/the state o f  affairs that he wins 1 million dollars next
year.” I propose that one should not take these “sound-effects” too seri­
ously. Why shouldn’t one say that a proposition is perceived or a state of
affairs asserted, as long as it is possible to connect a meaning with these
phrases? Namely: a proposition is perceived if, and only if, it is perceived
to be true, and a state o f affairs is asserted if, and only if, it is asserted to
obtain (and a proposition is hoped if, and only if, it is hoped to be true,
whereas a state of affairs is hoped if, and only if, it is hoped to obtain). But
it remains true that asserting states o f affairs and perceiving propositions
implies an analogical, secondary use of the verbs “assert” and “perceive”:
a proposition is (per analogiam) perceived, and a state of affairs asserted,
on the basis of something else being perceived, respectively asserted, in the
primary, non-analogical sense of these verbs. In this primary sense, in­
deed, states of affairs cannot be asserted (while propositions can be), and
propositions cannot be perceived (while states o f affairs can be).
Though states of affairs and propositions are normally named by the
same singular terms -  the singular terms of the form “that A” -  no state of
affairs is a proposition, no proposition a state of affairs: all propositions are
either true or false; but no state of affairs is either true or false. The rela­
tionship between states o f affairs and propositions, to the extent that they
are named by “that”-terms, is brought out by the following principle
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(which, by the way, does not imply that there is a one-to-one correspon­
dence between propositions and states of affairs):
Pl The proposition that A is true if, and only if, the state of affairs that
A obtains.
For example:
The proposition that snow is white is true if, and only if, the state of
affairs that snow is white obtains.
Another contrast between states of affairs and propositions is that all
propositions are abstract entities, whereas at least some states of affairs are
concrete entities. Even without delving deeply into the abstract-concrete
distinction, it is plain that it is legitimate to interpret the term “the world”
in a non-metaphorical sense to designate a certain comprehensive state of
affairs (and, as everyone knows, Wittgenstein used that interpretation in
the Tractatus). But the world is clearly not an abstract entity -  in whatever
non-metaphorical sense of the term “the world” may be understood. Hence
at least one state of affairs is not abstract. There are, however, other exam­
ples of concrete states of affairs: the state of affairs that the moon revolves
round the earth, the state of affairs that ice is lighter than water, etc. These
states of affairs are concrete, while the corresponding propositions -  the
proposition that the moon revolves around the earth, and the proposition
that ice is lighter than fluid water -  are abstract. In general, propositions
are abstract — hence objective, not subjective -  representations of states of
affairs;1 this is what their being consists in.
1 Representations for w hom l For us human beings, of course. Note that though a repre­
sentation is sometimes objective (not subjective: not in the mind), it is always a repre­
sentation for someone.
It should be noted that the paradigm cases of concrete entities -  physical
individuals -  do never occur without being embedded in a physical state of
affairs, and in fact cannot occur otherwise. Now, is it that a physical state
of affairs derives its physicalness from the physicalness of the physical in­
dividuals) that is (are) embedded in it, or is it rather the other way round?
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It seems to me indeed that it is the other way round. In any case: there can
be no doubt that there are physical states of affairs, and since, for analytical
reasons, everything physical is concrete, it follows that there are concrete
states of affairs. Some concrete states of affairs are therefore made con­
crete by being physical. Physicalists would say that all concrete states of
affairs are made concrete by being physical, since they believe that con­
crete and physical coincide. It seems to me, on the contrary, that they do
not coincide. But I leave this an open question, for it leads us too far afield.
States of affairs are in a rather robust sense ontologically prior to propo­
sitions, since the proposition that A, if it is true, is always true because the
state of affairs that A obtains; despite the fact that Pl is a biconditional, it
is never the other way around: that the state of affairs that A obtains be­
cause the proposition that A is true. It is also apparent that propositions are
more fine-grained than states of affairs: the proposition that Jack is older
than Mack is different from the proposition that Mack is younger than
Jack; but the state of affairs that Jack is older than Mack is certainly the
same state of affairs as the state of affairs that Mack is younger than Jack.
Both of these last-mentioned ontological data confirm the hypothesis, as­
serted above, that propositions are abstract objective representations of
states of affairs. As such, they have, moreover, a quasi-sentential nature.
For, besides being representations of states of affairs, propositions are ex­
pressed by true or false sentences, and the semantical relation of expres­
sion is of such a kind that, ontologically, the expressee (if I may say so) is
rather close to the expresser.
The following general picture of the relationship between propositions
and states of affairs appears to be correct: The field of propositions can be
divided into equivalence classes on the basis of the equivalence relation “p
proposes the same thing as q” (or in other words: “p represents the same
state of affairs as q”); these equivalence classes correspond one-to-one to
states of affairs. But has every state of affairs a non-empty class of repre­
senting propositions corresponding to it? Some states of affairs are too
comprehensive for having a propositional representation in which they are
not themselves mentioned; for example, this world, as a state of affairs, has
no propositional representation in which this world is not mentioned. But it
does have a propositional representation in which it is itself mentioned:
this world, as a state of affairs, is, plausibly, identical to the state o f affairs
States of Affairs -  The Full Picture 55
that this world obtains, and hence the proposition that this world obtains is
a propositional representation of this world. In general, a state of affairs S
-  because it is identical to the state o f affairs that S obtains (note that, for
this identity to hold in all cases, the name “S” must always be interpreted
as rigidly designating the state of affairs in question) -  can always be rep­
resented by the proposition that S obtains. Every state o f affairs has, there­
fore, a non-empty class of representing propositions corresponding to it.
No doubt, a propositional representation is imperfect if the represented
state of affairs is itself mentioned in it, but it remains a propositional repre­
sentation nonetheless.
3. How are states o f affairs related to tropes?
Tropes are individuals (or particulars), states o f affairs are not. Thus no
state of affairs is a trope, and no trope a state of affairs. However, regard­
ing their existence, tropes and states of affairs are closely related. This red,
for example, exists if, and only if, the following state of affairs obtains:
that the proximate bearer of this red is red. In general, we have
P2 This F  exists if, and only if, the proximate bearer of this F is F,
and
P3 x is F  if, and only if, the state of affairs that x is F is an obtaining
state of affairs,
and therefore:
P4 This F exists if, and only if, the state of affairs that the proximate
bearer o f  this F  is F  is an obtaining state of affairs.
This needs a few comments. (1) The “is” in “x is F” is of course the “is” of
exemplification. (2) Since tropes are individual accidents, they need a
bearer; the proximate bearer of this F  is that bearer of this F  which is not a
bearer of it in virtue of anything else being a bearer of it. In the case of this
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red, the proxim ate bearer is likely to be a certain region o f  the surface of a
m aterial object; that m aterial object is also a bearer o f  this red, but not the
proxim ate one. (3) In this context, I have made use o f  the indexical (or de­
m onstrative) mode of referring to tropes; however, the normal mode of re­
ferring to tropes is not via singular terms o f the form this F, but via singu­
lar term s o f  the form the (so a nd  so) F  o f  X  (where X  is the proximate
bearer o f  the trope, and “ so and so” indicates a specification o f F  which, if
necessary, makes the singular trope-referring term  uniquely referring). (4)
One can refer to tropes that do no longer exist and to tropes that never ex­
isted; for example, “the last sm ile o f  Peter is still well remembered by me”
and “the repentance o f  P eter never occurred.”
Does this F  exist because the proximate bearer o f this F  is F, or is the
proxim ate bearer o f  this F  J7  because this F  exists? P2 does not tell us how
to answ er this question. N or does P4 answer the question whether a trope
exists because the state o f  affairs that corresponds to it obtains, or whether
the state o f  affairs that corresponds to it obtains because  the trope exists. I
do not believe that there is an obvious answer to these questions. But sup­
pose that tropes were (in the sense just indicated) ontologically prior to
their corresponding states o f  affairs, would this m ean that tropes are sim­
p lic ite r  ontologically prior to states o f affairs? It would not -  since there
are states o f  affairs that do not seem to correspond to a trope or even to a
bundle o f  tropes (whereas o f  course every trope, since it has a certain state
o f  affairs corresponding to it, in its turn corresponds  to that state of af­
fairs), for example, the states o f  affairs (already m entioned in Section 1)
that this glass is not a g lass designed by N. N. and that it is either a glass
designed by N '. N '. or by N " .  N " .  Besides negative and disjunctive states
o f affairs, also relational states o f  affairs -  for exam ple, that Anne loves
P eter — pose an obstacle to assuming that tropes are (simpliciter) ontologi­
cally prior to states o f affairs, and therefore also to assum ing that states o f
affairs are reducible to tropes or bundles o f tropes. I, for m y part, do not
believe that ontological reduction can ever be a w orthwhile philosophical
undertaking, but if  reduction must be done, then reducing tropes to states
o f affairs seems the more prom ising project, since every trope corresponds
in an obvious way to a state o f affairs: this F  to the proxim ate bearer o f
this F  being F , and the F  o f  X  to X  being F, w here X  is the proximate
bearer o f  the trope.
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4. How are states o f affairs related to facts?
Facts are states of affairs that obtain. Hence every fact is a state of affairs.
But since not every state of affairs obtains, there are states of affairs that
are not facts. It is rather unfortunate that the highly useful distinction be­
tween states of affairs and facts is obliterated by the widespread practice of
treating the words “fact” and “state of affairs” as synonyms.
But what does it mean that a state of affairs obtains, that it is a fact! In
my view, to obtain, to be a fact, is what it means for a state of affairs to be
actual. In other words, facthood, obtaining, is the actuality of states of af­
fairs. The actuality of states of affairs can be used for defining the onto­
logically central concept of exemplification:
P5 X], ..., X n exemplifies RN if, and only if, the composition of RN
with Xi, ..., Xn  is an actual state o f affairs (an obtaining state o f af­
fairs, a fact).
Here RN stands for an N-adic universal (N a  1; if N = 1, then RN is a prop­
erty; if N a 2, then RN is a relation). For “the composition of RN with X t ,
..., XN” one can briefly write “[RN, Xb  ..., XN].” The composition-manner
of naming states of affairs is an ontologically more explicit manner of
naming them than the “that’’-manner. If RN is an N-adic universal and Xb
XN are entities which are (in the order presented) suitable for RN, then,
and only then, “[RN, Xb  ..., XN]” names a state of affairs; and it names a
fact if the state of affairs it names is actual. (The compositional suitability
just mentioned is the basis for all type-distinctions between universals.)
Sometimes a distinction is made between exemplification and instantia­
tion, such that, for instance, a certain red-trope instantiates redness,
whereas a red apple exemplifies redness, but does not instantiate it (is not
an instance of it, in contrast to the trope). The distinction between exempli­
fication and instantiation can be captured by treating instantiation as a
particular type of exemplification: instantiation is exemplification by indi­
viduals which are not substances. In view of this, the above definition of
exemplification can easily be supplemented by a definition that captures
the concept of instantiation -  if one insists on distinguishing exemplifica­
tion and instantiation. Interestingly, the need to distinguish instantiative
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and non-instantiative exemplification seems to be properly felt only in the
case of the exemplification of properties.
A note on actuality. Actuality is a so-called transcendental -  a transcate­
gorial ontological concept -  which, as such, applies to entities in every
ontological category. In every category, however, it manifests itself differ­
ently. Facthood is its manifestation in the category of states of affairs. The
conceptual relationship between existence and actuality is treated differ­
ently by different authors: some have identified existence and actuality,
others have separated them. In my view, the word “existence” is used on
different occasions to express different concepts, one of which is actuality.
5. How are states o f affairs related to events?
The right question to ask on being confronted with a reference to an event
which one is not acquainted with and which one wishes to know better is
this: What belongs to that event? And the answer to this question must in­
variably be that one is presented with a temporally ordered list of states of
affairs -  o f the states of affairs that belong to that event. (In the limiting
case, the temporal order consists of only one moment in time.) This sug­
gests that events are, basically, temporally ordered sequences of states of
affairs. Sometimes not every state of affairs in a temporally ordered se­
quence of states of affairs can be known, and often temporally ordered se­
quences of states of affairs are so rich in states of affairs that it is humanly
impossible to know or state all o f them (by stating sentences that express
propositions that represent those states of affairs). This is the source of the
typical ontological non-transparency of events, which, typically, makes
them like individuals: eventum (typicum) est ineffabile (cf. the well-known
dictum of medieval ontology: individuum est ineffabile).
Once events are treated as temporally ordered sequences of states of af­
fairs, there yet remains much room for further ontological questions. For
example, do all states of affairs that belong to an event belong to it essen­
tially, or do only some of those states of affairs belong to it essentially, or
is it perhaps the case that all the states of affairs that belong to an event do
not belong to it essentially? Are events regarding their essences homogene­
ous (which, for example, is the case if, fo r  every event E, all the states of
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affairs that belong to E  belong to it essentially), or are events regarding
their essences heterogeneous (which, for example, is the case if, fo r  some
event E, all the states of affairs that belong to E  belong to E essentially,
whereas for some other event E some state of affairs that belongs to E '
does not belong to E ' essentially)? It is not the task of this paper to answer
these questions, but a theory of events that treats events as temporally or­
dered sequences of states of affairs will have to answer them (for some ef­
forts in this direction, see Meixner 2000 and Meixner 2004a).
6. How are states o f  affairs related to truthmakers?
Some states of affairs are truthmakers. In fact, all — and only -  obtaining
states of affairs are truthmakers. They make true all propositions that repre­
sent them (and, via the propositions, they make true all the sentences that
may happen to express those propositions). The transmission-arm of truth­
making, so to speak, is displayed by Pl above, and more completely by
P6 A proposition p  is true if, and only if, some state of affairs that is
represented by p  obtains.
Like Pl, P6 is an analytic biconditional that could, it seems, be used to jus­
tify two rather different causal, or quasi-causal, consequences of itself and
the assumption that p  is a true proposition: (1) p  is true because some state
of affairs represented by p  obtains, or (2) some state of affairs represented
by p obtains because p  is true. But if “because” is to be used to introduce a
causal or quasi-causal explanation (and it is only this meaning of “be­
cause” which is relevant for explicating truthma^ing), then, as a matter of
fact, only the first “because”-statement is acceptable. It expresses the es­
sence of truthmaking -  and one may well wonder what is so interesting
about it as to justify the existence of the truthmaker-industry, by which I
mean the huge amount of ontological publications that have been dedicated
to the subject of truthmakers.
The reason why ontological writers are so interested in truthmakers and
truthmaking seems to be that there are two restricting conditions that to­
gether define relatively narrow boundaries for the puzzle-solving activity
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they so enthusiastically engage in. The first restricting condition is that not
all states of affairs are to be accepted as truthmakers -  negative and dis­
junctive states of affairs, for example, are not to be accepted as truthmak­
ers. Why not? -  The ultimate reason for many seems to be the assumption
that there simply are no such things as negative or disjunctive states of af­
fairs. Yet, there certainly are true negative propositions, and true disjunc­
tive propositions, among the former the highly interesting negative gen­
eral-existential propositions (for example, the proposition that no pig
flies). How  are these propositions made true by states of affairs that are
neither negative nor disjunctive? That seems to be a highly interesting
question.
The second, more or less implicit restricting condition is the tendency to
understand truthmaking in a truly causal, and not only quasi-causal, way.
This tendency suppresses the relatively obvious sense -  by making it look
inadequate -  in which states of affairs can be regarded as truthmakers: the
sense that can be gathered from Pl and P6 above if  these principles are
supplemented by the specification of a quasi-causal direction that runs
from states of affairs to propositions, and not vice versa. A new -  truly
causal sense — of truthmaking is being sought, and finding that sense seems
to be a highly interesting task.
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the deepest motivation be­
hind the quest for truthmakers does not seem to be simply a desire of an­
swering the question “What makes propositions true?”, but rather the time-
honored metaphysical desire of finding the ultimate sources o f actuality -
which would also be what ultimately makes propositions true, i.e., the ulti­
mate truthmakers. States o f affairs, however, can hardly be the ultimate
truthmakers. Though the actuality of states of affairs is the proximate
source of the truth of propositions, actual states o f  affairs are normally not
the ultimate source of that truth, since, normally, they are not the ultimate
sources of their own actuality. For normally it is not the case that an ob­
taining state of affairs obtains -  is actual -  per se. (Exceptions are such
states of affairs as the state of affairs that 1 = 1 or the state of affairs that
everything coloured is extended.) Normally, an obtaining state of affairs
obtains only per alterum: there is a factmaker for it; but then, if we are to
avoid an infinite regress, we must, in tracing back the line of factmakers,
arrive at a state of affairs that either obtains by chance (without cause) or
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by cause of something that is not a state of affairs, perhaps God or Scho­
penhauer’s Will, or another rational or irrational agent. Therefore, either
chance or something else that is not a state of affairs is the ultimate truth­
maker for every true proposition that is not made true by a state of affairs
that obtains per se.
7. What are states o f affairs needed for, especially non-obtaining ones?
Thus, states of affairs cannot -  usually -  be ultimate truthmakers, and
hence, a fortiori, they usually are not needed as ultimate truthmakers.
Many states of affairs, indeed, serve as proximate truthmakers, namely all
states of affairs that are represented by true propositions. But if they are not
the ultimate truthmakers of these propositions, their role of proximate
truthmakers for them can hardly be ontologically impressive. Therefore, to
rest the case for states of affairs on their truthmaking function is a very
shaky matter indeed.
Moreover, only half of all states of affairs are facts and in the truthmak­
ing business. What is the other half of states of affairs needed for? Noth­
ing? Should we, so to speak, discard the rest, the non-obtaining states of
affairs, because non-obtaining states of affairs -  as long as they do not ob­
tain -  cannot be truthmakers (neither ultimate nor proximate ones)? Speak­
ing here of discarding is metaphorical language: the literal question is, of
course, whether we should assume that there are no non-obtaining states of
affairs because non-obtaining states of affairs cannot be truthmakers. The
straightforward answer is: we ought not to assume that there are no non­
obtaining states of affairs because non-obtaining states of affairs cannot be
truthmakers -  since there are good reasons to assume that there are non­
obtaining states of affairs, reasons which have nothing to do with truth­
making.
What are those reasons? They have already been alluded to in Section 1 :
states of affairs, obtaining and non-obtaining ones, are the intentional ob­
jects of various intentional attitudes. It may seem at first sight that this is
not much of a reason for assuming that some entities are states of affairs -
indeed non-obtaining states of affairs — but on closer inspection it becomes
evident that the rootedness in intentionality is all we have in any case.
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What, for example, is our reason for assuming that some entities are physi­
cal individuals? If physical individuals were not the intentional objects of
various intentional attitudes o f ours, we would have no reason for this.
Against the attempt to capitalize on an analogy between states of affairs
and physical individuals, one might object that physical individuals are
much more firmly entrenched intentional objects of ours than states of af­
fairs: that they cannot be extracted from the web of intentionality, while
states of affairs can be thus extracted, especially non-obtaining ones. But
this is an illusion. Let me illustrate:
Consider the moon, a physical individual. What do you (gentle reader)
know about the moon? That it revolves around the earth in a period of
about 28 days; that it does not revolve around its own axis; that you have
often seen it in the sky; etc. Obviously, you don’t know the moon without
knowing a lot of facts -  obtaining states of affairs -  about it; obviously,
you could not know the moon without knowing a lot of facts about it.
Moreover, have you ever seen the moon on its own, so to speak, without its
being embedded in a plethora o f states o f affairs that make their appear­
ance to you at the very same time the moon does? Certainly not. But very
many of those visually appearing states of affairs are in fact non-obtaining
ones -  and yet, it is the moon they, so to speak, represent to you -falsely,
but at the same time, it is only through their false representation that you
originally know of the moon at all and can begin to find out the truth about
it. For example, in visual appearance it seems to you that the moon is a
perfectly round disk o f white light, just like the sun, only that the moon’s
light is not as bright as the sun’s. It also seems to you that the moon is not
very fa r  away from you, that it sits fo r a short while on the top o f yonder
mountain, that it stands motionlessly in the sky, that it is bigger near the
horizon and yellow, etc. All of these states of affairs do not obtain. Yet, if
you extract these states o f affairs from the web o f  intentionality, you are
epistemically cut off from the moon -  just about as much as a blind spider
that lives in a deep cavem is epistemically cut off from it.2
2 Well, not quite, for there may be other people who may tell you a lot of truths about
the moon. But the knowledge you gain from them is not original. Original knowledge
of and about the moon starts precisely with the visual appearing o f the above-men­
tioned non-obtaining states of affairs and cannot be had without this appearing. Note
that if  nobody had any original knowledge about the moon, it would be unlikely that
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8. Are there negative states o f  affairs?
Arguing against negative states of affairs has exercised some metaphysi­
cians to an extraordinary degree; other metaphysicians have been exercised
almost as much by defending negative states of affairs. But what is a nega­
tive state o f affairs? Is a state of affairs negative if, and only if, a proposi­
tion that represents the state of affairs is expressed by a negation-sentence?
In that case, it will turn out that every state of affairs that is named by a
singular term o f the form “that A” is a negative state of affairs. For the
state of affairs that A is represented by the proposition that it is not true
that non-A, which proposition is expressed by the negation- sentence “It is
not true that non-A”. Thus, the state of affairs that snow is white would
turn out to be a negative state of affairs, since the proposition that it is not
true that snow is not white, which represents that state of affairs, is ex­
pressed by the negation-sentence “It is not true that snow is not white”.
Is it a better idea to define a negative state of affairs as a state o f affairs
that is a negation o f  some state o f affairs? But then the assertion that there
are no negative states of affairs would amount to the assertion that no state
of affairs is a negation of any state of affairs -  and there do seem to be ob­
vious counterexamples to this latter assertion. For example, the state of af­
fairs that 1 is larger than 2 does seem to be a negation of the state of af­
fairs that 1 is at most as large as 2 -  in the sense that the former state of
affairs cannot obtain together with the latter, and that at least one of the
two states o f affairs must obtain. The only way out of this strait is to claim
that, contrary to appearances, one of the two apparent names for states of
affairs -  “that 1 is larger than 2” and “that 1 is at most as large as 2” -  fails
to name any state of affairs. But how could one plausibly justify such a
claim? (If the reader should happen to be of nominalist persuasion, he or
she may consider instead of the chosen example the state of affairs that
Angela Merkel is identical with George Bush and the state of affairs that
Angela Merkel is different from George Bush.}
there be any knowledge at all about it. There is knowledge that is purely non-original
(for example, the knowledge modem physicists have about subatomic particles), but
not all knowledge can be of this kind, and knowledge about the moon, it seems to me,
is not of this kind.
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As a matter of fact, one can give an argument to the conclusion that
every state of affairs is a negation of some states of affairs. The argument
is presented below. But here we may already take note of its conclusion.
This conclusion implies that there can only be no negative states of affairs
if  there are no states of affairs at all -  z/one follows the above definition of
what it is to be a negative state of affairs. But is there any other purely on­
tological definition of what it is to be a negative state of affairs than just
that definition? (Note that we are not looking here for an epistemico-onto-
logical definition of negative state o f affairs., after all, those who defend or
oppose negative states of affairs intend their discussions to deal with a
purely ontological matter.) Doubtlessly, being a negation of some state of
affairs is in any case a necessary condition for being a negative state of af­
fairs (how could something be a negative state of affairs without being a
negation of some state of affairs?). But what more could be required for
constituting a purely ontological necessary and sufficient condition for be­
ing a negative state of affairs than just this: being a state of affairs which is
a negation of some state of affairs? For my part, I don’t know what more
could be required.
But here is the above-announced argument to the conclusion that every
state of affairs is a negation of some state of affairs: Either there are states
of affairs or there are none. In the latter case, it is trivially true that every
state of affairs is a negation of some state of affairs. In the former case, we
turn to considering a particular kind of state of affairs: maximal-consistent
states o f affairs^ which are defined as states of affairs that do not comprise
every state of affairs, but that cannot be enlarged without comprising every
state of affairs. The following principle — it can be regarded as a definition
-  explains the central concept involved in this definition of maximal-con­
sistent states of affairs:
P7 A state of affairs X comprises a state of affairs Y if, and only if,
there is a state of affairs Z such that X is the conjunction of Y and Z.
Moreover, put in more precise terms, the phrase “state of affairs X cannot
be enlarged without comprising every state of affairs” means just the fol­
lowing: there is no state of affairs Z such that (1) the conjunction of the
states of affairs X and Z is different from X and (2) the conjunction of the
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states of affairs X and Z does not comprise every state of affairs. Finally,
for what follows the next principle is crucial:
P8 (a) MCC(X) is the set of maximal-consistent states of affairs that
comprise X; (b) to every set M' of maximal-consistent states of af­
fairs there corresponds a state of affairs X' such that M' =
MCC(X').
Consider, then, any state of affairs X; consider further MCC(X) as defined
by P8(a). Consider, moreover, the ^AC-relative complement M ' of
MCC(X), in other words: the set of all maximal-consistent states o f affairs
that are not elements of MCC(X). According to P8(b), M' = MCC(X'), for
a certain states of affairs X'. Since X obtains if, and only if, X ' does not
obtain, it is clear that X is a negation of X ' (and X' a negation of X).
But how does it follow that X obtains if, and only if, X' does not obtain?
For a state of affairs, to obtain means to be comprised by one particular
maximal-consistent state of affairs: the world. Suppose X obtains, hence X
is comprised by the world, and hence the world belongs to the set
MCC(X); consequently the world does not belong to the set M ', and hence
not to MCC(X'). Therefore, the world does not comprise X ', hence X'
does not obtain. Suppose, conversely, X' does not obtain, hence the world
does not belong to MCC(X'), and hence not to M'; consequently the world
belongs to the set MCC(X) (which is the MC-relative complement of M' as
much as M' is the MC-relative complement of MCC(X)), hence the world
comprises X, hence X obtains.
Every argument relies on premises, and every argument can, in princi­
ple, be rejected by denying or by merely not believing those premises. But
if one intends the rejecting of premises as a substantial criticism of an ar­
gument -  and not just as a reiteration of one’s own standpoint -  one should
have a better reason for the rejecting of premises than simply the reason
that one does not accept the conclusion of the argument. Now, the above
argument really has only one premise that one might consider rejecting
(the rest is logical machinery): P8(b). But is there a good reason for reject­
ing P8(b)? Note that, on the contrary, there is an elementary consideration
that strongly suggests the truth of P8(b):
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The maximal-consistent states of affairs in a set M' of maximal-consis­
tent states of affairs surely have something in common (mereologically),
and if they have something in common, then they have a maximum in com­
mon: a state of affairs X ' all of them comprise which is not comprised by
any other state of affairs that all of them comprise. Clearly, M' is a subset
of MCC(X') (i.e., of the set of maximal-consistent states of affairs that
comprise X'; see P8(a)). And one can hardly assume that MCC(X') is not
also a subset of M'. Therefore: M' -  MCC(X').
Suppose one assumed that MCC(X') is not a subset of M , while M' is
known to be a subset of MCC(X'). As X' stands to M ', so Y stands to
MCC(X'): Y is a state of affairs all the elements in MCC(X') comprise and
which is not comprised by any other state of affairs all of them comprise;
hence, since all the elements in MCC(X') comprise X' (according to
P8(a)), either X' = Y or X ' does not comprise Y. But X ' comprises Y,
since M' is a subset of MCC(X') (hence what all the elements in M' have
in common must comprise what all the elements in MCC(X) have in com­
mon). Therefore, X' = Y. But this can’t very well be, since, as has been as­
sumed, M' is a proper subset of MCC(X').
9. Are there disjunctive states o f  affairs?
The principle P8(b) can also be used to show that there are disjunctive
states of affairs (if there are any states of affairs at all). Suppose X and X'
are states of affairs. Consider MCC(X) U MCC(X'). Since MCC(X) and
MCC(X') are each a set of maximal-consistent states of affairs, MCC(X) U
MCC(X') is also such a set. Hence, according to P8(b), there is a state of
affairs X "  such that MCC(X” ) = MCC(X) U MCC(X'). It is easy to show
that X " obtains if, and only if, either X or X ' obtains (keeping in mind
that, for a state of affairs, to obtain means to be comprised by the world,
which is a particular maximal-consistent state of affairs); X ” is, therefore,
a disjunction of the states of affairs X and X', and hence it is a disjunctive
state of affairs.
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10. When are states o f affairs identical to each other?
To avoid confusion in answering this question, one must keep in mind that,
although states of affairs and propositions can both be named by singular
terms of the form “that A”, states of affairs are not propositions; in particu­
lar, states of affairs are not as fine-grained as propositions (see Section 2).
Indeed, there is a general way to their being more coarse-grained than
propositions; that way is exhibited by the following principle:
P9 For all states of affairs X and X ': if X # X', then MCC(X) *
MCC(X').
In other words: states of affairs are identical if they are comprised by the
very same maximal-consistent states of affairs (making use of P8(a)). Or in
other words again: states of affairs are identical if they obtain in the very
same possible worlds (identifying possible worlds with maximal-consistent
states of affairs, and taking to obtain in the possible world Y to mean just
this: to be comprised by the maximal-consistent state o f affairs Y). Thus,
since the state o f affairs that Jack is older than Mack and the state o f af­
fairs that Mack is younger than Jack obtain in the very same possible
worlds, it follows, according to P9, that they are identical. Assuming the
following generalization of P l,
PIO For all maximal-consistent states of affairs Y (i.e., possible worlds
Y): the proposition that A is true in Y if, and only if, the state of af­
fairs that A obtains in Y (i.e., is comprised by Y),
it follows that the proposition that Jack is older than Mack is true in the
very same worlds in which the proposition that Mack is younger than Jack
is true. But this does certainly not make these two propositions identical.
It is easily seen that P8 and P9 together imply that the states of affairs
can be mapped one-to-one onto the sets of maximal-consistent states of af­
fairs (i.e., onto the subsets of the set of maximal-consistent states of af­
fairs). Since possible worlds have already been identified with maximal-
consistent states of affairs, this one-to-one correspondence cannot be used
to justify a reduction of states of affairs to sets of possible worlds. But cer-
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tainly it indirectly justifies those ontologists who have identified states of
affairs with sets of possible worlds. There is nothing wrong with this iden­
tification, though it can seem wrong if one expects of states of affairs what
one can only expect of propositions.
11. Are there existential states o f  affairs?
That I  exist is an (obtaining) singular-existential state of affairs, and that
there is a human being is an (obtaining) general-existential state of affairs.
Hence there are existential states of affairs. And there are other devices
than “thaf’-names for designating existential states of affairs. If “AC” des­
ignates the property o f actuality, then [AC, X], the composition of AC with
X (see Section 4), is a singular-existential state o f affairs, for every X. It is
another question whether all of those states are actual, i.e., whether all of
them obtain.
Perhaps some readers will deny that the property of existence is identical
with the property of actuality. Perhaps they will even deny that actuality
might legitimately be called “existence”. Then, let “IS” designate the prop­
erty o f being identical with something’, [IS, X] -  the composition of IS with
X -  is certainly a singular-existential state of affairs, for every X, and this
time we can also be certain that all of those states of affairs obtain (which
means that every X exemplifies IS; see P5 in Section 4). If some readers
believe that they neither refer to IS nor to AC when they use the name “the
property of existence” (and use it as actually naming the (ontological)
property o f existence, and not just as a façon de parler), I am sorry to say
that I do not know what they are talking about (note that the property o f
being self-identical is no other property than IS).
A general-existential state of affairs, that there is an F , is simply the dis­
junction of the states of affairs [F, X], for all X; or in other words: it is the
negation of the conjunction of the states of affairs [non-F, X], for all X.
(The uniqueness of the result of disjunction, conjunction, and negation for
states of affairs is a consequence of P8 and P9.) Thus, for example, the
state of affairs that there is a flying fish is the disjunction of the states of
affairs [(the property of being a) flying fish, X], for all X. Note that [(the
property of being a) flying fish, X] is no other state of affairs than the state
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of affairs that X  is a flying fish. Hence that there is a flying fish is the dis­
junction of the states of affairs that X is a flying fish, for all X. And this
disjunction obtains if, and only if, the state of affairs that X is a flying fish
obtains for some X. (For the theoretical underpinnings of all this, see my
recent book, The Theory o f Ontic Modalities.)
12. Are there modal states o f affairs?
That it is possible that the sun revolves round the earth is an obtaining mo­
dal state of affairs. That it is necessary that the earth revolves round the
sun is another modal state of affairs, but this time a non-obtaining one.
Modal states of affairs need not be states of affairs over and above the
states of affairs that were in Section 10 established to correspond one-to-
one to sets of maximal-consistent states of affairs. That it is possible that
the sun revolves round the earth, for example, is the state of affairs [POSS,
that the sun revolves round the earth], and it is ruled by the following gen­
eral principle for POSS (possibility):
Pl 1 For all states of affairs X: (a) MCC([POSS, X]) = MCC if, and only
if, MCC(X) * 0 ;  (b) MCC([POSS, X]) = 0  if, and only if,
MCC(X) = 0 .
Here MCC is the set of (all) maximal-consistent states of affairs, 0  the
empty set, MCC(X) the set of (all) maximal-consistent states of affairs that
comprise X (see Section 8). Because of the one-to-one correspondence (via
the function MCC(X)) between states of affairs and sets of maximal-con­
sistent states of affairs, it is clear, according to Pl 1, which state of affairs
[POSS, X] is identical to, depending on whether MCC(X) * 0  or MCC(X)
= 0 .  In the former case, it is identical to what one might call the minimal
state o f affairs (or the tautological state o f affairs, since it is represented by
any tautological proposition); in the latter case, it is identical to what one
might call the maximal state o f affairs (or the self-contradictory state o f af­
fairs, since it is represented by any self-contradictory proposition).
The corresponding general principle for necessity (NECS) is this:
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P I2 For all states of affairs X: (a) MCC([NECS, X]) -  MCC if, and only
if, MCC(X) = MCC; (b) MCCQNECS, X]) = 0  if, and only if,
MCC(X) * MCC.
Clearly, according to P l 1 and modal intuition, MCC([POSS, that the sun
revolves round the earth]) is MCC, and therefore [POSS, that the sun re­
volves round the earth] obtains (since the world is an element of MCC);
and according to P12 and modal intuition, MCC([NECS, that the earth re­
volves round the sun]) is 0 ,  and therefore [NECS, that the earth revolves
round the sun] -  or in other words: that it is necessary that the earth re­
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